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Summary: This article advocates a comprehensive approach to the current
crisis in the Euro Area - and, namely, the joint consideration of the economic
and political issues at stake. The European integration - whose greatest devel-
opment is, to present time, the Monetary Union - is a political project: a matter 
of will and action. Surely, this political project has a strong and specific eco-
nomic component. Still, it is political. Therefore, political variables are critical. 
They must be included in any analysis of the financial and economic circums-
tances, and they must be considered in any strategy to overcome the current
roadblock. The Euro Area has to cope, not only with excessive indebtedness,
fiscal unbalances and financial markets, but also with the democratic restric-
tions to austerity and economic recession, and with the democratic requirement
to respect social rights, to look for public support and to engage in political
dialogue and compromise. In liberal democracies, as ours, the employment,
social protection, citizenship and the right to believe and hope are full goals for
the public policies, including the economic and fiscal ones.
Key words: Europe, Public policy, International economy.
JEL: A14, F02, G01.
 
 
 
 
Since its beginning in 1952, the European integration is one of the most important 
and original processes the world system has experienced. The First World War took 
place in Europe and the Second World War emerged and partially developed also in 
the Old Continent. The primordial and main goal of the European integration was to 
prevent the occurrence of a new military conflict. During the Cold War, the expan-
sion of the European Economic Community (EEC) represented, on the one hand, a 
reinforcement of the position of the liberal-democratic states and, on the other hand, 
a moderating force to North-American hegemony. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, first the 
engagement and then the enlargement of the Community into the Southern countries 
that had just overcome long dictatorships, proved to be essential to the success of 
their democratisation. Subsequently, a new wave of democratic transitions spread to 
various regions of the world. From 1989 onwards, new steps taken by the European 
Union (EU) towards integration were crucial to the stabilisation of the social and po-
litical situation of the Continent as a whole. This refers either to the enlargement of 
the EU into the former Eastern European countries, or to the linkage of the reunifica-
tion of Germany to the creation of a single currency, the euro. 
The 28 member states sum up to a total of 506 million EU inhabitants, being 
the greatest product and consumer market of the world. The 18 member states cur-
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rently grouped in the Euro Area represent 333 million people. So, the huge effects of, 
first, the financial crisis of 2008 and, then, the so-called sovereign debt crisis of 
2010, must be equated as a critical issue, both in terms of economic policies and in-
ternational relations. This issue demands an interdisciplinary approach, one that 
could be inspired by sociological and political theory, along with economic theory. 
 
1. Literature Survey: Less Interdisciplinarity than It Would Be 
Suitable  
    
Unfortunately, there is a very weak consciousness of the need and advantages of such 
an interdisciplinary approach. Of course, the current European crisis has been con-
sidered by eminent sociologists, like Ulrich Beck (2013) or Jürgen Habermas (2013), 
and the economic and fiscal policies have been carefully scrutinised under such a 
perspective. Among the economists, Dani Rodrik (2012, pp. 214-220) examined the 
experience of transnational governance inherent to the EU, as a possible way towards 
the political regulation of globalisation. In this framework, Rodrik identified both the 
results and the gaps of the European institutional architecture, namely regarding the 
response to the 2008 crisis. By means of their access to media, top researchers like 
Joseph Stglitz, Paul de Grauwe, and Paul Krugman offer a very acute reflection on 
the fragility of political orthodoxies to deal with the structural causes of the Great 
Recession. 
Nevertheless, the scientific routine, well established according to disciplinary 
divides, still prevent us from a broader approach to the current crisis and the prevail-
ing policies. This article aims to suggest that a deeper dialogue between social scien-
tists from various proveniences could help us in designing such an approach. 
 
2. The Uniqueness of the European Union 
  
In the year of 2011, the GDP per capita of the EU was close to the Japanese; and the 
GDP per capita of the Euro Area was higher, supplanted only by the United States of 
America (USA) (see Table 1). Together, the Euro Area and the USA were responsi-
ble for more than one third of the world’s GDP (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
2012, p. 179). The kind of regional integration that the EU has been pursuing stands 
as a paradigm for other regions, in Asia or in North America, in South America or in 
South Africa. 
 
Table 1  GDP per capita, Euro Area, USA and Japan, 2001-2011 (Power Purchasing Parity, PPS, 
EU-27=100) 
 
Regions / countries 2001 2011
EU-27 100 100
Euro Area 112 108
USA 156 148
Japan 115 105
 
Source: Eurostat (2013b). 
  
Being central to the world system, the EU is also absolutely unique. It is sin-
gular because of the approach followed in the integration process, since the founding 
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decision of pooling the management of industrial resources useful for military pur-
poses. And it is singular because of the entity that was eventually created: a sui 
generis association of several states, which share critical elements of national sover-
eignty, according to different forms and timings of integration and in a rather plastic 
and heterogeneous set of interdependencies. So we have, for example, a dominant 
German-French partnership on the economic and institutional dimension of the EU, 
and a critical English-French leadership in security and military affairs; and many 
countries do cultivate specific geostrategic links, that add value to the EU - for in-
stance, the special relationship the British have with the USA, or the link between the 
Germans and Central and Eastern Europe, between the Spanish and the Portuguese 
and Latin America, or between the French and the Portuguese and Africa. 
Nevertheless, the most important singularity of the European integration has 
been its triple commitment to political democracy, economic growth, and the Wel-
fare State. If we consider the three economic centres of the world system - North 
America, Europe and Pacific Asia - Europe has been the one who took more seri-
ously into account and the one that in fact achieved that “squaring the circle” as Ralf 
Dahrendorf and Artur Morão (1996, p. 16) put it. This is the ultimate meaning of the 
so-called European social model. The enlargement towards East, in the 2000 decade, 
weakened this model; but it didn’t disappear, and is still very unique. 
Central and singular as it is, the European integration is indeed a political 
process. Surely, its geo-historic and even civilisational basis is quite clear: first the 
EEC and then the EU have been evolving, in the last half a century, towards the total-
ity of the European territory. The European integration has a clear cultural matrix, 
also unique, marked as it is by diversity, its major richness: national, regional, urban, 
linguistic, religious diversity, as well as in terms of cultural patterns, philosophical 
traditions, arts and civic culture. This diversity is the very fundament of the devel-
opment and to the future of the “idea of Europe” (George Steiner et al. 2006, pp. 49-
50). Still, the best way to formulate the European project is to call it a political proc-
ess. 
For two complementary reasons. Firstly, it is an action: the expression of a 
will to act, and its concretisation in a programmed, intended and meaningful inter-
vention. It was an action primordially conceived, advocated and launched by a group 
of pioneers, who were politicians and technocrats of a few number of countries. 
Then, the action was carried on, through several decades, by individuals and institu-
tions, and supported with more or less enthusiasm by nations and public opinions. A 
European public sphere was constituted this way, a sphere that does not replace each 
national one, but crosses and complements it. In fact, the European project is so pre-
cise because of its political nature: at the end of the day, it depends on the collective 
and institutional engagement it motivates, gaining or loosing energy and speed ac-
cording to the strengthening or the weakening of that engagement. If one misunder-
stands the voluntarism of the European project, one cannot comprehend EU’s present 
and future. 
Secondly, the European integration is a political process as it copes with the 
very essence of politics: the presentation of several and different forces, the institu-
tionalised conflicts between them, the steps and stages of this quite dynamic play. By 
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forces we mean interests, traditions, structures, patterns of culture, which are sepa-
rated by national, regional and group divisions, and which are expressed on various 
juridical, institutional and behavioural dimensions. The political process is really the 
combination of these multiple dimensions and players. 
Therefore, we cannot say that the European integration is, exclusively or 
mainly, an economic process. It is a much more comprehensive approach, and an act 
of will. We shall readdress this point latter in the article. 
But the economy always played a crucial role in this political, comprehensive 
process. The economy has been a sort of entrance door. Until the creation of the sin-
gle currency, the European integration evolved systematically by means of cumula-
tive advancements in the economic sectors: the pooling of industrial resources useful 
for military purposes, the launching of a common agricultural policy, the orientation 
towards a single market, the rather difficult building of a common stance in the Uru-
guay Round, the Monetary Union. Since the beginning, this economic approach has 
intended to overcome the long-established mistrust and antagonism between nations, 
by prioritizing the production, consumption and trade activities. Finally, the political 
process of European integration aimed to incorporate the economic principles of ra-
tionality and entrepreneurship, settling the freedom of initiative and circulation 
against the old and strong protectionist traditions. 
 
3. The Nature of the Current Crisis 
 
This is the perspective I wish to adopt in my reflection on Europe’s future: the inte-
gration process whose most advanced form is presently the Euro Area is a political 
process, in which the economy plays a critical role, and which is absolutely unique 
and central, worldwide. 
This perspective helps us to frame the facts. Of course, it is impossible to talk 
about the Euro Area with no reference to its huge crisis. The economy has declined, 
and there was nothing but a very thin recovery during the second semester of 2013. 
We could and should say that the European crisis from 2008 onwards was the conse-
quence of the global financial crisis whose epicentre was located in America. But, 
eventually, the European crisis has acquired some features and an intensity of its 
own, and it became one of the major obstacles to the recovery of the world economy 
(António Mendonça 2012, pp. 93-128; see Table 2). The turning point has been the 
crisis of the sovereign debts, since the year 2010, and the negative effects of the as-
sistance programmes to the peripheral countries. Nowadays, the risk of the implosion 
of the Euro Area seems to be surpassed, due to a more proactive behaviour of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), in the summer of 2013. Still, several asymmetries are 
threatening the Monetary Union. 
But we must consider the relevant issues. And they are related to very specific 
features of the recent history of the European integration. First and foremost, the po-
litical hegemony of Germany, and its egoistic logic (Habermas 2013), imposing a 
kind of “German universalism”, that reproduces in the Euro Area the pattern once 
applied to the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) (the East, sovietised, 
Germany) (Beck 2013, pp. 80-84). With no visible resistance so far, this hegemonic 
behaviour clearly contradicts the European institutional paradigm, settled as it was on 
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the equality of USA, the consensus among countries and political currents and the 
intercommunity solidarity. 
 
Table 2  The Forthcoming Evolution of Great Economies, According to the 2013 Autumn Forecast of 
the European Commission (EC), (GDP Real Growth, in %) 
 
Economy 2012 2013 (estimate) 2014 (outlook) 2015 (outlook) 
EU -0,4 0.0 1.4 1.9 
Euro Area -0.7 -0.4 1.1 1.7 
USA 2.8 1.6 2.6 3.1 
China 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.4 
Japan 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.3 
(World) (3.3) (3.2) (4.0) (4.4) 
 
Source: EC (2013a). 
 
Secondly, the design of the Monetary Union was based on some options that 
eventually proved to be wrong (Casimir Dadak 2011). Surely, its development has 
been uneven, since there were no equivalent steps in the crucial fields of fiscal and 
tax policies or bank supervision. Still, the most important error was the acceptance of 
two major German impositions: on the one hand, the ECB’s mandate, over focused 
on price stability; on the other hand, the renouncement to link the ECB to the inter-
ests of the whole Euro Area, in terms of monetary policies instrumental for economic 
needs, such as the inflation control, of course, but also the external deficits control 
and the economic stimulus (see João Ferreira do Amaral 2013, pp. 65-93). 
These inadequacies in the architecture and functioning of the Euro Area were 
catalysed by the logic of the current globalisation of the financial markets. A logic 
that is increasingly deregulating them, making them permeable to speculative activi-
ties and taking them further away from the productive economy. And we all know 
that this trend of extreme “financialisation” of the world economy was one of the 
major causes of the 2008 crisis.  
Furthermore, Europe suffers from the negative effects of the deregulationist 
beliefs and the dogma of the fiscal consolidation at any cost (Angelos A. Antzoulatos 
2012). These policies reconquered the hegemony in Europe only a year and a half 
after the anti-cyclic decisions of the European Council in December 2008, launching 
an expansive fiscal policy. And they have been resisting both the theoretical principle 
that fiscal policies must be anti-cyclic, expanding when the economy is slowing 
down and reducing when the economy is accelerating, and the practical verification 
of its shortcomings, be it in the economic or fiscal level. Even the positive results of 
the alternative, expansionist policies launched firstly in the USA and now in Japan 
are not convincing the European orthodox authorities of the need to change the plan. 
This set of factors is really downgrading the Euro Area’s global position. And 
this can be changed by European institutions and political players. 
We must understand adequately the nature of the European present difficul-
ties. They are not the unavoidable consequence of the paradigmatic transformation of 
the world economy. Indeed, this transformation can only be welcomed by the Euro-
pean spirit. Europeans cannot but appreciate the “rise of the South” - and I quote the 
last Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
2013). According to its predictions, together, Brazil, China and India will surpass, no 
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later than 2020 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
Sates, and in 2050, they will represent circa 40% of the world GDP, in huge contrast 
with the 10% they represented in 1950. The development of the emergent economies 
and the “massive rise of the middle classes” in the South (UNDP 2013, pp. 11-15) 
are good news for all those that advocate a more balanced world and a more equita-
ble distribution of power. And this is one of the explicit goals of the European for-
eign policy, as it has been established throughout the years. We wisely say that social 
welfare is a drive, not an obstacle, to the economic development; similarly, we have 
to recognize that multi-polarity facilitates, instead of harming, the world equilibrium 
and cooperation. 
The fact is that, even within the present overwhelming difficulties, now com-
prehending 28 member states and subjected to the new conditions of global economic 
competition, the EU still embodies today the ideal of 10, 20 or 30 years ago, as the 
region that combined in the most interesting way the triple objectives of political 
democracy, economic growth and social cohesion. That is, the region with the high-
est records in terms of human development. The 2012 Human Development Index 
marked 25 of the 27 EU’s member states (all except Romania and Bulgaria) as “very 
high development” countries; 4 EU’s countries belonged to the top 10, 8 to the top 20 
and 16 to the top 30. And when we consider the Gender Inequality Index, the Euro-
pean position increases: 7 EU countries in the top 10, 13 in the top 20, and 20 in the 
top 30 (UNDP 2013). 
 
4. Structural versus Circumstantial Issues 
 
I do not want to minimize the various and complex problems the Euro Area is cur-
rently facing. I am asking for some sense of relativity and context. We must distin-
guish structural from mere circumstantial issues; and we must consider the multiplic-
ity of the restrictions we have to deal with. 
So, on the one hand, the modern and highly developed European societies 
need to respond to the consequences of global economic change - that is pushing to-
wards East and South an important part of the industry and services, and that is in-
creasing the role and place of emergent economies in the world trade. Simultane-
ously, we all see the erosion of the classical means for the regulation of capital 
movements. This change produces critical effects on the European pattern of eco-
nomic specialisation, and on its competitive advantages. The European repositioning 
process depends on its capacity to adjust to the new conditions of the world econ-
omy. 
Demography is another structural issue. Europe suffers from an absence of vi-
tality, in terms of natural growth, that the immigration fluxes, deterred as they are, 
are not compensating. When we compare the EU to other major populations, we ob-
serve that it only performs better than Japan and Russia. According to the Eurostat 
(2013a), the fertility rate is 1.6 children per woman in the EU; and the share of the 
age group 65+ is larger than the one of the age group <15 years (respectively 19% 
and 15% of the population). 
On the other hand, life expectancy at birth is now 77 years for men and 83 
years for women, in the EU. And the educational attainments are quite good: 70% of 
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those aged 25-64 years have at least an upper secondary education; only 12% of the 
girls and 16% of the boys aged 18-24 years have already left school without that 
educational level. 
All of these are well-known data. From a normative perspective, some repre-
sent undesirable problems - and the ageing of the population because of low birth 
rates is perhaps the most worrying one. But others must be viewed as welcomed dif-
ficulties: for instance, the ageing associated to longer life expectancy, or the increase 
of education demand. In terms of public policies, all of them constitute sensible is-
sues that underlie basic and conflictive choices on the design, functioning and financ-
ing of the systems that provide key social goods, such as social security and solidar-
ity, health care, education, science, and arts. Economic growth seems to be a neces-
sary precondition for the Euro Area countries, in order to at least maintain their lev-
els of accomplishment of these social needs. Conversely, a political option that 
would mean to renounce to at least part of those levels would question precisely the 
fundaments of the uniqueness, the goal-achievement capacity, and the world central-
ity of the European developmental project. 
However, neither the EU nor the Euro Area is a homogeneous territory. And 
one of the major objectives of the integration process - the convergence between the 
various countries and regions - is still unfulfilled. On the contrary, the division has 
grown, at least on some dimensions or by certain criteria. 
It is worthwhile to concentrate a bit on this theme, for it is underestimated in 
the current political and academic debate. In March 2013, Eurostat compared the 
2010 GNP per capita, in terms of purchase power parity, of the 270 Nomenclature of 
Units for Territorial Statistics 2 (NUTS 2) regions that then constituted the EU. The 
richest region was located in the United Kingdom. Its GNP valued 328% of the 
European average. The poorest region belonged to Bulgaria, and its GNP represented 
26% of that average. Let us see, in Table 3, where there are located the 41 regions 
that were richer than 125% of the average, and the 68 regions that were below 75%. 
 
Table 3  Inter-Regional Inequality in the EU, 2010 
 
Countries with regions whose GNP per capita is 
higher than 125% of the European average  
(number of regions) 
Countries with regions whose GNP per capita is  
less than 75% of the European average  
(number of regions) 
Germany (8) 
Austria, Netherlands (5) 
Italy, Spain, United Kingdom (3) 
Finland, Sweden (2) 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Slovakia (1) 
Luxemburg* (1)  
Poland (15)
Czech Republic, Greece, Romania (7) 
Hungary (6) 
Bulgaria, Italy (5) 
France**, Portugal, Slovenia (3) 
United Kingdom (2) 
Estonia*, Latvia*, Lithuania*, Slovenia, Spain (1) 
 
Note: * No regional division; ** overseas departments. Please note that the number of regions is quite variable, according to 
the area and the administrative organisation of each country.  
Source: Eurostat (2013c). 
 
It is easy to note that this inter-regional inequality characterises both the EU-
27 and the Euro Area. But, for the later, this is a more problematic question: with no 
convergence, the conditions for a Monetary Union’s viability (or economic sense) are 
at risk. 
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I just drew a list of topics, such as the competitiveness and the world speciali-
sation of the Euro Area’s economy; the increasing demographic and social needs that 
it must address; the worsening of its internal inequalities. I only want to stress out 
that economic growth is a prerequisite for the Euro Area to deal effectively with 
structural challenges and restrictions. Of course, fiscal sustainability, in the short and 
long run, defines another major challenge, and also a major restriction to the full 
utilisation of typical instruments of economic policy, be it Keynesian or close to it. 
But even this fiscal challenge needs economic growth to be overcome (see, for in-
stance, Emanuel Augusto dos Santos 2012). 
However, this orientation towards growth is precisely what is denied by the 
orthodoxy that now rules the European institutions - and specially the Euro-group. 
This is perhaps the most important obstacle to European action. By denying the 
communitarian and national policies the means indispensable to promote growth, the 
current European orthodoxy weakens our capacity to influence and monitor the repo-
sitioning of Europe in the world economy. In doing so, it increases the probability 
that such repositioning might represent a real downgrade of the European position, 
with negative consequences to the Europeans’ welfare, the uniqueness of the Euro-
pean project, and also the world system as a whole. 
 
5. Political Issues 
 
I will move on to my second point: the need to consider the several restrictions that 
form the present European conjuncture. If I may summarize, the first point was to 
separate structural from circumstantial issues - and to single out the exact knot where 
do converge the circumstantial and the structural: that is, the political blindness re-
garding growth. Now, I want to emphasize that, in our current situation, in Euro 
Area, the critical variables cannot be reduced to the economic sphere and the fiscal 
consolidation. Misunderstanding this fact is one of the major obstacles to react effec-
tively and adequately to present difficulties. Unfortunately, Brussels, Frankfurt and 
Berlin, blinded by their fiscal obsession, fail to recognize this obstacle. 
In my opinion, this is a terrible error, both analytically and politically. On the 
contrary, as the title of this article clarifies, we have to consider the political dimen-
sions of the European repositioning. 
For two reasons. Firstly, the European integration is, as we have seen, a politi-
cal process and project. It was, and still is, a strategy to build and consolidate peace 
in Europe, to democratize all European regimes and to modernize European societies 
(including the capital axis of modernization that is social integration, see Nicos P. 
Mouzelis 2008, pp. 145-163). Secondly, one major consequence of ignoring the eco-
nomic, social and political dimensions of the fiscal and financial problem is to 
weaken the minimal economic, social and political conditions necessary to the solu-
tion of this problem. There are limits to the social regression, the political disaffilia-
tion and the economic recession, and if we violate these limits we shall have a boo-
merang effect. And those who cannot understand this will not be able to draw viable, 
democratic solutions. The opposite is true: a European political program to overcome 
the present debt and fiscal crisis has to incorporate a sense of humanism, equilibrium 
and social engagement. 
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I will give just an illustration of the dramatic role of the political issues for the 
future of the Euro Area. I choose two, both critical, issues. The first one relates to the 
image of the institutions, as well as the people’s trust. The other one concerns the 
political participation of European citizens. 
First, please see these two indicators, used in the surveys regularly promoted 
by the EC: EU’s public image (Table 4) and the trust in political institutions (Table 
5). 
 
Table 4  The EU’s Image, Autumn 2006 - Autumn 2012 (%) 
 
Year Total “positive” Neutral Total “negative” Don’t know Total 
2006 46 34 17 3 100 
2007 49 34 14 3 100 
2008 45 36 17 2 100 
2009 48 35 15 2 100 
2010 38 40 20 2 100 
2011 31 41 26 2 100 
2012 30 39 29 2 100 
2013 31 39 28 2 100 
 
Source: EC (2013b). 
 
Table 5  Europeans’ Trust in the Institutions, Autumn 2006 - Autumn 2012 (% of those Who Declare 
to Trust) 
 
Year EU National Parliament National Government 
2004 50 38 34 
2005 45 35 31 
2006 45 33 30 
2007 48 35 34 
2008 47 34 34 
2009 48 30 29 
2010 43 31 28 
2011 34 27 24 
2012 33 28 27 
2013 31 25 23 
 
Source: EC (2013b). 
 
The erosion of EU’s image is clear. In 2006, the total of positive evaluations 
was almost three times higher than the total of the negative ones. Now, they are al-
most at the same level. The downgrading occurred in 2010, the year of the sovereign 
debt crisis and the sudden move to a pro-cyclic, recessive European policy. Mistrust 
in the political system is a widespread phenomenon, but Table 5 shows that the EU 
lost part of its advantage comparing with national institutions: 10 years ago, half of 
the respondents to the Eurobarometer declared to trust in the EU; today, the equiva-
lent proportion is less than one third. 
So we have striking alerts, in what regards the public perception and evalua-
tion of political institutions. But there are others, equally relevant, in the field of civic 
engagement. The last concluded edition of the European Social Survey (ESS 2010), 
whose data relate to the end of 2010, shows a reasonable commitment to politics: 
more than 40% of the respondents say they are very or quite interested, only one fifth 
say they are not at all interested (Table 6). But let’s have a closer look to the young-
sters: even if we put aside the adolescents, and focus on the age group 18-30, only 
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6% of these Europeans say that they are very interested in politics, and 28% say they 
are not all interested. Young generations are telling us that they are less committed to 
politics, no matter the intensity of the commitment. 
 
Table 6  Europeans’ Interest in Politics, by Age Group, 2010 (%)  
 
Age group Very interested Quite interested Hardly interested Not at all interested Total 
<18 3.0 20.0 39.6 37.3 100 
18-30 5.8 26.4 39.6 28.3 100 
31-45 8.0 32.9 37.7 21.3 100 
45-60 11.1 37.2 34.5 17.1 100 
>60 13.0 36.8 30.5 19.6 100 
Total 9.7 33.6 35.2 21.5 100 
 
Note: The survey was applied to residents (national or foreigners) in 28 countries, including 22 member states of the EU (all 
except Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta and Romania). 
Source: ESS (2010), author’s calculation.  
 
Data regarding real electoral behaviour unveil the same trend. When asked 
about their attitude in the last national election, the large majority of the citizens of 
28 European countries answered that they had voted, 71% (76% of the eligible to 
vote) (Table 7). But the share comes down to 60% of the eligible (44% of the total), 
among the youngest. Even in the group aged 31-45, the share of non-voters is above 
the average. European vote is getting older!   
 
Table 7  Europeans’ Vote in Last National Election, by Age Group, 2010 (%) 
 
Age group Yes No Not eligible to vote Total 
<30 44.4 30.2 25.5 100 
31-45 71.0 25.1 3.9 100 
45-60 79.6 18.5 1.9 100 
>60 82.3 16.7 1.0 100 
Total 70.9 22.0 7.1 100 
 
Note: The survey was applied to residents (national or foreigners) in 28 countries, including 22 member states of the EU (all 
except Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta and Romania). Voting in national elections is formally compulsory in Belgium and 
Greece, but it is not enforced. 
Source: ESS (2010), author’s calculation.  
 
The indicators I consider here are quite rough, and do not substitute an in-
depth analysis of the political turmoil subsequent to the eruption of the 2008 crisis. 
Throughout Europe, political situation is extremely volatile; it has in common with 
the economic and financial conjuncture the elements of uncertainty and instability, 
and the serious risk of an uncontrollable drift. For a straight, simple reason: politics 
and economy are different dimensions of the same phenomenon. 
Of course, we are not facing a situation equivalent to that of the 1920’s and 
1930’s. As an effect of the huge effort Europeans did in the post-World War II, we 
now have a consolidated democracy, the Welfare State is implemented and Govern-
ments have means and mandate to intervene in the economies. This is one more ar-
gument to preserve the European pattern, in the current crisis.   
 
 
 
 581 The Repositioning of the Euro Area in the World System: Political and Economic Dimensions 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp. 571-584
6. Conclusion: A Case for Political Economy 
 
The European integration - whose greatest development is, to present time, the Mon-
etary Union - is a political project: a matter of will and action. Surely, this political 
project has a strong and specific economic component. Still, it is political. 
Therefore, political variables are critical. They must be included in any analy-
sis of the financial and economic circumstances and they must be considered in any 
strategy to overcome the current roadblock. The roadblock paralyses, most of all, the 
Euro Area, and with a huge potential of destruction all over the world. So, the Euro 
Area has to cope, not only with excessive indebtedness, fiscal unbalances and finan-
cial markets, but also with the democratic restrictions to austerity and economic re-
cession, and with the democratic requirement to respect social rights, to look for pub-
lic support and to engage in political dialogue and compromise. In liberal democra-
cies, as ours, the employment, social protection, citizenship and the right to believe 
and hope are full goals for the public policies, including the economic and fiscal 
ones. And the political orientation towards those goals is a condition, perhaps a sine 
qua non condition, to a minimum of social acquiescence, if not active support, that is 
so necessary for a democratic policy, be it economic or not, to be put in action and 
accomplished. 
Therefore, it would be a terrible mistake to minimize the political dimensions 
of the Euro Area’s present crisis. Above all, we cannot ignore the intersection of the 
economic and political dimensions - there lays the “Gordian Knot” we must undo. 
Our problem resides, of course, on the current fragility of states vis-à-vis the finan-
cial markets; on the accumulation of excessive fiscal deficits; on the disparities be-
tween core and peripheral countries (see João Rebelo Barbosa and Rui H. Alves 
2011). But equally important, if not more important, are issues such as the volume of 
unemployment, either among youngsters or among adults, the loss of families’ in-
come, the economic breakdown - and those less measurable but equally critical va-
riables that we name as fear, despair, mistrust and disaffiliation. Ignoring these issues 
means to have an incomplete strategy facing the crisis. Moreover, it means to let the 
crisis evolve to a pattern and to a dimension that will challenge the possibility of a 
democratic control and outcome. 
I have no competence to add something valuable to the debate that is going on, 
among economists, about the future of the Euro Area. In political terms, I belong to 
the so-called federalist camp, the one that conceives the Monetary Union as a crucial 
step further in the direction of a sui generis consociation of sovereign States and the 
consolidation of a social and political Europe, less divided and unequal, be it in re-
gional, national or developmental terms. 
Throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s, the EU has really progressed towards that 
goal. The progress was made in parallel paths: the single market, the trade policy, the 
Monetary Union, the foreign affairs, the security and defense common policy, the 
European space for science and higher education, the Schengen area, and so on. 
Some of these paths experienced a stronger progress than others. But they are still 
parallel. And the characteristic leadership of the economic initiatives has been com-
patible with the preference the European method always conceded to the economy, 
as we have already seen. Finally, on the one hand, the Euro Area does constitute a 
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dynamic, changeable, configuration; and, on the other hand, the Euro Area is one of 
several constellations the institutional architecture of Europe allows for, compatible 
with others forms and arenas of European integration (see Luís Amado and Teresa de 
Sousa 2012, pp. 131-191). 
Euro, the single currency, is a political construct. It played a crucial role as 
one of the keys used by Europe to successfully cope with the post-Cold War. As a 
political device, the euro is neither immutable nor irreversible. Today, we see, under 
a different light, the economic shortcomings of that device, and its non-intended ef-
fect of strengthening the German unilateral leadership. Personally, instead of the 
question of the disaggregation of the Euro Area, I prefer the question of the restruc-
turing of its principles and means, in order to really fulfill the requirements and ca-
pabilities of a Monetary Union. Key issues to that structuring are the following ones: 
the responsibility and mandate of the ECB; the European bank supervision; tax con-
vergence; to mutualize, even if partially, the sovereign debts; a European budget; 
and, of course, political sensibility and wisdom to deal with the fiscal consolidation 
and the rules and objectives of the 2012 Fiscal Stability Treaty. 
Meanwhile, I wish to emphasize the role of the economists. The participation 
of economists in the current public debate is crucial, because the crisis in the Euro 
Area and its overwhelming consequences for the whole world are really a question of 
political economy. 
I do not claim that economics have to return to its ancient name of political 
economy. But I do think that one should remember the classical spirit. And we need 
that spirit to triumph over the so-called economic worldview which substitutes for-
malism for empirical research, and cultivates an ideologically biased approach. 
That is what I request. I ask for economics as a scientific alternative to moral-
ist, almost religious, discourse that can only envisage vice and virtue, crime and pu-
nishment, sin and redemption. I ask for economics as a social science, suited to insert 
and analyse markets within the context of human institutions and social structures - 
considering markets as the social institutions they also are. I ask for economics as a 
science of balancing, a science of complexity and dynamism, able to single out poli-
cy mixes adequate to real problems and contexts. Finally, I ask for economics as an 
analytical and decisional discipline, ready to analytically inform decision-making, 
although realizing that decisions are not reducible to economic choices, but are also 
related to values, attitudes, and political ideas. Therefore, science is not a dogmatic 
orthodoxy. Instead, it is an intellectual framework for distinctive, reasonable alterna-
tives. 
We do need that economics - a social science focusing on the dynamic com-
plexity of our empirical world, assessing and suggesting various alternatives and pol-
icy mixes. In such hard times, we need it more urgently and deeply than ever.   
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